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THE “PRINTED PUBLICATION” BAR AS 
APPLIED TO PRESENTATIONS MADE AT 
SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Every year, thousands of scientific conferences are held in the United 
States and throughout the world.1 These conferences are important events 
for the scientific community.2 At conferences, scientists present the results 
of their research, learn about new developments in their field of expertise, 
and network with peers.3 However, a conference may contain hidden 
dangers for scientists who are unfamiliar with current United States patent 
law.4 Scientists may find, when they later attempt to patent an invention, 
that presenting the results of their research at a scientific conference has 
destroyed their ability to obtain the patent.5  
Congress has provided that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new 
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, 
subject to the conditions and requirements of [Title 35 of the United States 
Code (the “Patent Act”)].”6 The statutory definition of novelty, along with 
 1. The publishers of one online commercial index state that it “indexes about 10,000 
conferences a year” in fields such as “agriculture and environmental sciences, biochemistry and 
molecular biology, biotechnology, medicine, engineering, computer science, chemistry, and physics.” 
See Thomson ISI, Web of Science Proceedings/Science & Technology Edition, http://www.isinet.com/ 
products/citation/proceedings/istp/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2005). 
 2. See Beryl L. Bellman & Alex Tindimubona, Global Networks and International 
Communications: AFRINET (Nov. 23–26, 1991), http://www.nsrc.org/AFRICA/regional-reports/ 
afrinet.txt (stating, “Modern scientific research relies heavily on the ability to communicate; gather 
reliable data; have access to widely dispersed data and information (including analysis); collaborate on 
projects; hold discussions, meetings, seminars, and conferences; and repackage and disseminate the 
results. . . . A scientist isolated . . . soon becomes obsolescent.”). 
 3. See Thomas E. Clarke, Value of Attendance of Scientists and Engineers at 
Scientific/Engineering Conferences: Motivation and Recognition Factor (July 8, 1996), http://www. 
stargate-consultants.ca/artconf.htm (stating that attendance at scientific or engineering conferences 
allows attendees to stay up to date in their field of technology, identify interesting areas for future 
research, network with potential research partners or clients, and receive peer recognition for the work 
they have done). 
 4. In particular, scientists must be familiar with recent court decisions interpreting the U.S. 
patent statute. As discussed in this Note, interpretation of the statutory language by courts has not 
always led to an intuitively obvious result. See, e.g., infra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 5. As discussed below, a scientist will be unable to patent an invention that was disclosed in a 
“printed publication” more than one year before the patent application was filed. See infra note 16 and 
accompanying text. This Note discusses when a presentation will be considered a “printed publication” 
for purposes of the statute.  
 6. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). Congressional authority to provide for a system of patents is given in 
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other conditions for patentability, is set forth in section 102 of the Patent 
Act.7 Inter alia, this section provides that a person is not entitled to a 
patent if “the invention was . . . described in a printed publication in this or 
a foreign country . . . more than one year prior to the date of the 
application for patent in the United States . . . .”8 At the time this provision 
was included in the statute there was only one method of producing a 
“printed publication,” but with technological advances since that time, 
determining whether a reference should qualify as a “printed publication” 
under section 102(b) has become much more complicated.9 Today, courts 
deciding whether a reference constitutes a “printed publication” generally 
consider factors of public dissemination and public accessibility.10  
This Note will discuss how the printed publication analysis relates to a 
slide or poster presentation made at a scientific conference.11 First, this 
Note will discuss the history of the printed publication statutory bar and 
how courts have interpreted this requirement.12 In particular, this section 
will focus on a recent Federal Circuit decision, In re Klopfenstein, in 
which the court considered whether a printed slide presentation constitutes 
a “printed publication” for purposes of the Patent Act.13 Next, this Note 
will analyze whether current case law is consistent with the statutory 
language and previous decisions interpreting the Patent Act.14 Finally, this 
Note will suggest that Congress should amend the statute to legislatively 
overrule the Klopfenstein decision and to provide more guidance for courts 
applying the Patent Act to modern means of communication.15
the United States Constitution, which states that “Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 7. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
 8. Id. § 102(b). The term “printed publication” is also used in section 102(a) of the Patent Act, 
which provides that an applicant is not entitled to a patent if “the invention was known or used by 
others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, 
before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent.” Id. § 102(a). 
 9. Gulliksen v. Halberg, 75 U.S.P.Q. 252, 253 (Bd. App. 1937). See also In re Tenney, 254 F.2d 
619, 622 (C.C.P.A. 1958) (noting that “countless cases” have considered “the question of what is or is 
not a printed publication” and that “[i]rreconcilable conflicts exist as between the holdings of a number 
of them”).  
 10. See infra notes 45–54 and accompanying text. 
 11. For discussion on how the printed publication bar has been applied to other types of 
references, see generally Wesley Kobylak, Annotation, Meaning of Term “Printed Publication” 
Under 35 U.S.C.S. § 102(a) and (b), Denying Patentability to Invention Described in Printed 
Publication Before Invention by Applicant or More Than One Year Prior to Date of Patent 
Application, 70 A.L.R. Fed. 796 (1984). 
 12. See infra notes 16–115 and accompanying text. 
 13. 380 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See infra notes 91–115 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra notes 116–34 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra notes 135–39 and accompanying text. 
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II. HISTORY 
Section 102(b) of the Patent Act imposes a statutory bar on 
patentability for inventions described in a printed publication more than 
one year prior to application for a patent, even where the printed 
publication was made available by the inventor himself and there is no 
indication that he was not the first inventor.16 The printed publication acts 
as a piece of “prior art”17 that bars patentability.18 One explanation for this 
requirement is that the patent applicant cannot take back an invention that 
he has made available to the public.19 While he is given a one-year grace 
 16. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). Section 102(a) covers the situation where a claimed invention 
was described in a printed publication by another individual prior to the time of invention by the 
applicant. See id. § 102(a) (2000); see also supra note 8. 
 17. The term “prior art,” commonly used to refer to the references listed in section 102, comes 
from the language of section 103(a), which provides as follows: 
 A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or 
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter 
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have 
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to 
which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in 
which the invention was made. 
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000). 
 18. The printed publication bar and other statutory bars listed in section 102 will destroy 
patentability when a patent application claims an invention that has already been disclosed in a piece 
of prior art, or in other words, in one of the types of references listed in the statute. Hybritech, Inc. v. 
Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Section 103 will prevent a patent 
from being issued when two or more references in the prior art, considered together, disclose every 
element of the claimed invention and there is a suggestion, teaching, or motivation to combine the 
references and a reasonable expectation of success from so doing. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1124–25 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Additionally, sections 102 and 
103 can be used by the defendant in a patent infringement suit or by the plaintiff in a declaratory 
judgment case to invalidate an already issued patent; the statutory list of “defenses in any action 
involving the validity or infringement of a patent” includes “[i]nvalidity of the patent or any claim in 
suit on any ground specified in part II of this title as a condition for patentability [§§ 101–103].” 35 
U.S.C. § 282 (2000). This Note generally refers to the effect of 102(b) on patentability, but the legal 
analysis will be the same when a court is determining whether to invalidate an already issued patent 
under section 282. 
 19. The general argument is that a patent is granted in exchange for the patentee’s disclosure of 
information in the patent application, and that when the claimed invention has already been disclosed 
to the public, the patent applicant has nothing to offer the public in return for the exclusive rights he 
would be granted through a patent. See In re Tenney, 254 F.2d 619, 624 (C.C.P.A. 1958) (collecting 
sources and concluding that “in consideration for the patent grant, something must be given to the 
public which it did not have before . . . . If the public is already possessed of that ‘something,’ or if it is 
accessible to the public, there is a failure of consideration and no patent may be granted.”); see also 
Gulliksen v. Halberg, 75 U.S.P.Q. 252, 254 (Bd. App. 1937) (opining that the printed publication bar 
to patentability was intended “to allow an inventor to dedicate his invention to the public by 
distribution of legible copies of a description thereof in places where the public could have access 
thereto”). 
 An invention may be “dedicated to the public” by any of the means described in section 102(b), 
which provides that patentability is defeated if “the invention was patented or described in a printed 
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period in which to file an application, after this time the patent applicant 
may not receive a patent on an invention that has been dedicated to the 
public.20
The term “printed publication” was first included in the Patent Act in 
1836.21 At that time, a printed publication could only be produced by 
hand-setting type, locking the type in a frame, coating it with ink, and 
pressing paper to produce an imprint.22 In 1937, the Board of Patent 
Appeals and Interferences noted that the term “printed publication” 
“necessarily had a restricted and specific meaning” at the time the statute 
was written, but that “the art of printing has undergone [so] many radical 
changes” since that date that “it would be almost impossible to have any 
printing done in accordance with the process in use in 1870.”23 Because of 
these changes in printing technology and the development of new 
technologies, courts have needed to develop tests to determine when a 
reference should be classified as a printed publication for purposes of the 
Patent Act.24
publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year 
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). 
 20. See Tenney, 254 F.2d at 626. The Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform explained 
the rationale for the one-year grace period as follows: 
 Long and firmly established traditions in the United States scientific community 
encourage open and free communication through early publication and dissemination of the 
results of scientific research. Yet, prior public disclosure of the substance of an invention 
serves as the most fundamental bar to the ability of an inventor to obtain patent protection. 
The U.S. patent laws provide a compromise to these two opposing principles through a grace 
period⎯an explicit right of an inventor to prevent the patent defeating effect of an earlier 
publication or public disclosure of the invention for a one-year period following the 
disclosure. . . . The grace period is . . . of critical importance to the scientific community in 
facilitating early dissemination of research results, while preserving the patenting opportunity 
of the inventor for a reasonable period. 
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PATENT LAW REFORM, A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 47 
(1992) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT].  
 21. I.C.E. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 250 F. Supp. 738, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). For a more 
thorough discussion of the historical background of this statute, see Richard W. Hoffman, Comment, 
What Constitutes a Printed Publication Under the Patent Act, 1988 DETROIT C. L. REV. 961, 962–64 
(1988). 
 22. Gulliksen, 75 U.S.P.Q. at 253. 
 23. Id. 
 24. One scholar described the necessity of going beyond the words of the statute as follows:  
Since the original statutory language predates even the typewriter (invented in 1867), and 
since the method of printing employed in 1836 has become commercially infeasible, [courts] 
must employ some degree of speculation as to legislative purpose, without engaging in the 
statutory construction debate between strict construction and legislative intent analysis. The 
alternative would be to read section 102 out of the statute. 
Max S. Oppenheimer, In Vento Scribere: The Intersection of Cyberspace and Patent Law, 51 FLA. L. 
REV. 229, 242–43 (1999). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss3/4
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The term “printed publication” first appeared in the Patent Act in 
conjunction with the phrase “public work.”25 The “public work” 
terminology, which had been part of the Patent Act since 1793, was 
dropped in 1870, while the term “printed publication” remained in the 
Patent Act.26 However, courts have held that “the present day statute . . . 
still contemplates ‘public’ knowledge or use.”27 This publicness 
requirement, while not included within the language of the current statute, 
has been of key importance to courts attempting to apply the printed 
publication bar to modern technologies.28 Because courts have concluded 
that the legislature intended the printed publication bar to cover references 
that are public in some way, they have used this general requirement to 
determine whether specific references should be classified as printed 
publications for purposes of the statute.29
While courts generally agree that a work must be “public” in some 
sense in order to constitute a printed publication, they have developed 
different rationales to explain this requirement, sometimes leading to 
inconsistent results.30 Two rationales that have been used in the past to 
explain the printed publication requirement, and that are still of some 
importance today, relate to the permanence of a reference31 and the 
likelihood that the reference will be reproduced.32 Today, however, the 
two most important rationales courts use to determine whether a reference 
should be categorized as a printed publication are the requirements of 
public dissemination and public accessibility.33
 25. I.C.E., 250 F. Supp at 740. 
 26. Id. at 741. One interpretation of this statutory revision is that “the statute as at present drawn 
does not contemplate any ‘public work’ as being a bar but some special public work, namely, a printed 
publication.” In re Tenney, 254 F.2d 619, 625 (C.C.P.A. 1958) (quoting Gulliksen, 75 U.S.P.Q. at 255 
(Edinburg, J., dissenting)). In contrast, the court in I.C.E. indicated that “printed publication” is a 
broader classification than “public work.” 250 F. Supp. at 740. The court explained that in the 1836 
Act “a ‘public work’ referred to a class of established publications or a book publicly printed and 
circulated, whereas a ‘printed publication’ was considered ‘broad enough to include any description 
printed in any form and published . . . to any extent.’” Id. (citing GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 376 (3d ed. 1867)). 
 27. Id. at 741. The court in I.C.E. further stated that “[b]y judicial construction, the word ‘public’ 
in this context has been construed to mean ‘not secret.’” Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Tenney, 254 F.2d at 627 (Worley, J., concurring) (noting “the extreme difficulty of 
stating with finality just what constitutes a printed publication, as well as the irreconcilable judicial 
conflicts which have resulted therefrom”).  
 31. See infra notes 41–44. 
 32. See infra notes 34–40. 
 33. See infra notes 45–51. 
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A. Reproduction and Permanence 
In 1958, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals34 stated in In re 
Tenney that it is “readily evident that what Congress was concerned with 
. . . was the probability that the subject matter would be made known to 
the American public.”35 The court’s discussion of this requirement focused 
on the idea that a printed publication is more readily reproduced and is 
thus more likely to come to the knowledge of the American public.36 Even 
though a printed publication may not always be reproduced and come to 
public knowledge, “[t]he law sets up a conclusive presumption to the 
effect that the public has knowledge of the publication when a single 
printed copy is proved to have been so published.”37 The court then 
concluded that a microfilm copy of a foreign patent application did not 
constitute a printed publication, because “[w]hile microfilming furnishes a 
means of multiplying copies, there is no probability, from a mere showing 
that a microfilm copy of a disclosure has been produced, that the 
disclosure has achieved wide circulation and that, therefore, the public has 
 34. The Court of Customs and Patents Appeals was a predecessor court to the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982). After 
being created in 1982, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, adopted as precedent the holdings of the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court of Claims. Id. 
 35. 254 F.2d at 626 (emphasis omitted). 
 36. Id. The court quoted at length from Judge Edinburg's dissent in Gulliksen v. Halberg, 75 
U.S.P.Q. 252 (Bd. App. 1937). Judge Edinburg stated as follows: 
 It has been suggested that the words “printed publication” as used in the patent statute 
have a special connotation and should be considered together rather than separately. If so 
considered, it is believed that “printing” would obviously refer to some mode of producing 
copies which would ordinarily be used in making a large number of copies so as to insure 
general distribution of copies. 
75 U.S.P.Q. at 255. 
 Judge Edinburg also noted that “the difference is that between multiplication and addition” and 
that while “human means of increasing the number of copies by writing are extremely limited,” 
printing allows the number of copies to be “multiplied indefinitely.” 75 U.S.P.Q. at 255 (quoting 
Keene v. Wheatley, 14 F. Cas. 180 (E.D. Pa. 1861) (No. 7644)). On the other hand, the majority in 
Gulliksen believed that the reproducibility of a reference “does not seem to have any particular 
weight” and that “[i]t seems to us that . . . the words ‘printed publication’ were used because in the 
days the statute was written, the printed press was about the only way distribution and accessibility of 
the work to the public could be provided.” Id. at 253–54. 
 37. In re Tenney, 254 F.2d at 627 (emphasis omitted). According to the court, “Congress no 
doubt reasoned that one would not go to the trouble of printing a given description of a thing unless it 
was desired to print a number of copies of it.” Id. at 626. The court noted that “though the law has in 
mind the probability of public knowledge of the contents of the publication, the law does not go 
further and require that the probability must have become an actuality.” Id. But see Browning Mfg. Co. 
v. Bros, Inc., 126 U.S.P.Q. 499, 503 (D. Minn. 1960) (stating that “to be a publication . . . there must 
be a distribution of a substantial number of the documents to the public generally, at least more than 
one; mere evidence of ability to mass produce is not enough”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss3/4
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knowledge of it.”38 This is because “[t]hough one would be more likely 
than not to produce a number of copies of printed material, one producing 
an item by microfilming would be as apt to make one copy as many.”39 
Thus, because the court felt that the likelihood of reproduction is the key 
inquiry in deciding whether a reference constitutes a printed publication, it 
held that a microfilm of a foreign patent application was not a printed 
publication under section 102(b).40
Another rationale sometimes given for the printed publication 
requirement relates to permanence of the record. A dissenting judge in the 
1937 case of Gulliksen v. Halberg reasoned that material that is not 
permanent in nature “cannot be regarded as falling within the designation 
‘printed publication’ used in the statute.”41 However, other courts have 
disagreed with this rationale. The majority in Tenney stated, “Clearly, 
Congress’ reason for excluding handwritten publications did not relate to 
the permanence of the publication, for it is common knowledge that there 
 38. 254 F.2d at 627.  
 39. Id. The court’s rationale seems to rest in large part on the cost and trouble of the method of 
printing available at that time, as compared to microfilming. The court stated, “In the case of printing, 
unless a number of copies were produced, a waste of time, labor and materials would result; present 
day microfilming methods, on the other hand, are as well designed to produce one microfilm as well as 
many without waste.” Id. A later court disagreed with the rationale in Tenney based on technological 
developments made since the time Tenney was decided: 
Historically, setting of type has been such a costly operation that it has not usually been 
undertaken unless a considerable number of copies were to be produced; printing, therefore, 
has suggested a likelihood of fairly wide distribution of its fruits, and it has been reasonable 
to assume that all printed disclosures would become a matter of common knowledge. Today, 
however, inexpensive “printing” or duplication or reproduction is sufficiently common and 
comparatively inexpensive for one copy or a comparatively few copies as it is for many; thus, 
the new methods and techniques may not be and usually are not evidence, nor do they cast up 
a reasonable presumption, of wide dissemination of their proceeds. . . . [I]t is no longer 
reasonable to assume as the majority of the court in Tenney apparently did, that the traditional 
methods of “printing” are the only acceptable methods, for the purposes of Section 102. In the 
light of modern developments, a preferable rationale for the result in Tenney would have been 
that the microfilmed material, whether “printed” or not, was not shown to be sufficiently 
accessible to the public so as to constitute a “publication” within the meaning of the statute. 
I.C.E. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 250 F. Supp. 738, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).  
 40. 254 F.2d at 627. Two concurring judges indicated that they agreed with the result, but not 
necessarily the reasoning of the majority. Judge Worley believed that other factors should be 
considered, “including not only the actual physical process employed in production or reproduction, 
but also availability, accessibility, dissemination and, perhaps, in some cases, even intent.” Id. 
(Worley, J., concurring). Judge Rich agreed that this microfilm should not be considered a printed 
publication, but stated that “[w]e must not be narrow in our view of the meaning of ‘printed’ and in 
novel situations should consider the facts to see whether the interested public has in fact had 
possession of the disclosure in the form of a general publication.” Id. at 629 (Rich, J., concurring). He 
believed that “dissemination, as distinguished from technical accessibility,” is “surely . . . the concept 
underlying the expression ‘printed publication.’” Thus, the “probability of wide circulation,” rather 
than the “degree of accessibility” should determine whether a reference is a printed publication. Id. 
 41. 75 U.S.P.Q. at 256 (Edinburg, J., dissenting). 
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are numerous handwritten manuscripts extant which are centuries old.”42 
Similarly, in Jockmus v. Leviton, Judge Learned Hand held that a widely 
circulated trade catalog, “however ephemeral its existence,” could 
constitute a printed publication.43 Thus, even though the trade catalog 
disclosing the invention was “meant to pass current for a season and to be 
superseded,” the court found it to constitute a printed publication because 
it was distributed to between 50 and 1000 persons.44
B. Public Dissemination and Accessibility 
Most courts today consider public dissemination or public accessibility 
of a reference to be the most important factors in deciding whether the 
reference should be classified as a printed publication under section 
102(b). For instance, in Philips Electronic & Pharmaceutical Industries 
Corp. v. Thermal & Electronics Industries, Inc., the Third Circuit held that 
“[t]he emphasis . . . should be public dissemination of the document, and 
its availability and accessibility to persons skilled in the subject matter or 
art.”45 The court thus stated that “the term ‘printed’ as used in section 102 
can include documents duplicated by modern methods and techniques, 
including the now well established process of microfilming.”46 Whether an 
individual reference is a printed publication, according to the court, 
 42. 254 F.2d at 625. 
 43. 28 F.2d 812, 813 (2d Cir. 1928). The court stated as follows: 
While it is true that the phrase, “printed publication,” presupposes enough currency to make 
the work part of the possessions of the art, it demands no more. A single copy in a library, 
though more permanent, is far less fitted to inform the craft than a catalogue freely circulated, 
however ephemeral its existence; for the catalogue goes direct to those whose interests make 
them likely to observe and remember whatever it may contain that is new and useful. 
Id. at 813–14. 
 44. Id. at 814. 
 45. 450 F.2d 1164, 1170 (3d Cir. 1971). The court noted, “Since the decision in Tenney, there 
have been revolutionary developments in techniques for reproduction, printing and dissemination of 
documents and data. The traditional process of ‘printing’ is no longer the only process synonymous 
with ‘publication.’” Id. The court adopted this holding and rationale from the district court decision in 
I.C.E. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 250 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The I.C.E. court explained its 
interpretation of the statute as follows: 
 After reviewing the cases in this area, it might be said that the term “printed publication” 
as contemplated by Congress in 35 U.S.C. 102 can include a document printed, reproduced or 
duplicated by modern day methods, including microfilming, upon a satisfactory showing that 
such document has been disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons 
interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, 
can locate it and recognize and comprehend therefrom the essentials of the claimed invention 
without need of further research or experimentation. 
250 F. Supp. at 743. 
 46. 450 F.2d at 1170. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss3/4
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depends on whether it has been disseminated or “otherwise . . . made 
available and accessible to persons concerned with the art to which the 
document relates.”47 Based on this test, the court concluded that a 
microfilmed and indexed foreign patent application did constitute a printed 
publication under section 102.48  
In 1981, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals adopted the Philips 
Electronic rationale in In re Wyer.49 The court held that the phrase “printed 
publication” should be regarded as a “unitary concept,” in part because 
“interpretation of the words ‘printed’ and ‘publication’ to mean 
‘probability of dissemination’ and ‘public accessibility,’ respectively, now 
seems to render their use in the phrase ‘printed publication’ somewhat 
redundant.”50 The court concluded that the phrase “printed publication” 
should be interpreted as a whole to require public dissemination or 
accessibility.51
Thus, to determine whether a reference qualifies as a printed 
publication, courts engage in a fact-specific analysis of the public 
dissemination or public accessibility of the reference. This may be an 
 47. Id. at 1171. 
 48. Id. at 1172. 
 49. 655 F.2d 221 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
 50. Id. at 226. 
 51. Id. When a reference is not widely disseminated, the question becomes how accessible it is to 
persons having ordinary skill in the art. See Jennifer M. Wright, A Contemporary Patent Act: Finding 
a Useful Definition of “Printed Publication” in the Age of the Internet and On-line Research, 85 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 732, 739 (2003). This has been an especially litigated issue when the 
reference is a college thesis. Depending on factors such as the indexing system in the school library, 
courts have reached different conclusions on whether individual theses are printed publications under 
section 102. Compare In re Bayer, 568 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (holding that an uncatalogued and 
unshelved thesis known only to the student and three members of a reviewing committee was not a 
printed publication), with In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that a dissertation 
cataloged and placed in the main collection of the Freiburg University library in Germany was a 
printed publication under the statute). See also Ex parte Herschberger, 96 U.S.P.Q. 54, 57 (Bd. App. 
1952) (holding that a single loose-leaf copy of a thesis in a university library, available for reading but 
not for copying, qualified as a printed publication because “[t]he requirements are simply that the 
reference should be printed and that it shall be a publication,” and both these requirements were met). 
 Judge Rich stated in 1958 that he felt some courts had gone too far in applying the printed 
publication bar to college theses. In re Tenny, 254 F.2d 619, 629 (C.C.P.A. 1958) (Rich, J., 
concurring). He opined that “the real significance of the word ‘printed’ in the term ‘printed 
publication’” is “the probability of wide circulation.” Id. He then stated as follows: 
Were it otherwise, logic would require the inclusion within the term of all unprinted public 
documents for they are all “accessible.” While some tribunals have gone quite far in that 
direction, as in the “college thesis cases,” I feel they have done so unjustifiably and on the 
wrong theory. Knowledge is not in the possession of the public where there has been no 
dissemination, as distinguished from technical accessibility, and surely the former is the 
concept underlying the expression “printed publication.” 
Id. 
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easier and more practical approach than attempting to literally apply words 
written in 1836 to technologies developed since that time,52 but it has led 
to less than intuitive results in some cases.53 In particular, the public 
dissemination or public accessibility test, as applied by courts today, may 
lead to counterintuitive results when the reference consists of a slide show 
or poster presented at a scientific conference, with no documents ever 
physically distributed to members of the public. While this reference may 
disclose the invention to the relevant public, it does not seem to fit within 
the plain meaning of either a “printed” document or a “publication.” This 
Note discusses recent cases considering whether a presentation constitutes 
a printed publication under section 102 of the Patent Act.54
 52. At least one scholar has suggested that the modern test has made determining whether a 
reference qualifies as a printed publication more simple, stating as follows: 
 Ironically, the necessity of defining the phrase “printed publication” in terms of modern 
methods of reproducing copies such as microfilming and photocopying has clarified rather 
than complicated the courts’ task. The courts until recently felt it necessary to address 
separately the “printed” and “publication” requirements. They thus fell immediately into the 
thorny problem of construing the word “printed” as it was codified by the early framers of our 
law for whom the sole distinction between set type and handwriting posed no difficulty. To 
avoid this, the apparent trend is to view the phrase as a single concept whose primary 
requirement is that whatever means of “printing” used should be susceptible of wide 
dissemination. Using such an approach, the court need only decide if the document has in fact 
been widely distributed. Handwritten and typewritten documents are thus considered on the 
basis of how widely seen they are, as are displays—without actual distribution—of 
documents to a mass audience. 
Kobylak, supra note 11, at 803 (internal cross-references omitted). 
 53. See, e.g., Herschberger, 96 U.S.P.Q. at 57 (using the public accessibility test to determine 
that a partially typewritten and partially handwritten thesis could still be considered a printed 
publication, “especially in view of the permanent and non-fugitive character of inks of to-day [sic]”). 
Extending the printed publication bar to handwritten material seems inconsistent both with the plain 
meaning of the phrase “printed publication” and with the original statutory distinction between 
documents printed from type and those written by hand. 
 54. In addition to qualifying as a printed publication within the meaning of the statute, in order to 
defeat patentability under section 102(b) a reference must also disclose all elements of the claimed 
invention and have sufficient disclosure to enable a person having ordinary skill in the art to practice 
the invention without undue experimentation. See F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and 
the Law and Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 81–87 (2003). For an 
example of a case where the reference in question did not meet these additional requirements, see 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Daig Corp., 221 U.S.P.Q. 595, 604 (D. Minn. 1983) (noting that a published article 
and a related slide show presentation did not “disclose a device substantially similar” to the claimed 
invention, nor did they “enable one skilled in the art to construct or be put in possession of the 
[claimed invention] with only mechanical skill and no undue experimentation,” and that these 
references thus did not defeat the patent under section 102(b)). This Note does not address the question 
of disclosure and enablement, and for purposes of this Note it is generally assumed that a reference 
contains the elements necessary to defeat patentability of a claimed invention when a court finds the 
reference to constitute a printed publication within the meaning of the statute. 
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C. Slide and Paper Presentations  
An oral presentation of a paper or a slide presentation at a conference 
will generally qualify as a printed publication when copies of the paper or 
presentation are made available to the public.55 Where copies of the 
presentation or paper are not made available, courts have generally found 
that the presentation does not constitute a printed publication.56
In Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. AB Fortia (“MIT”), the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that a paper orally presented 
at a conference qualified as a printed publication because copies of the 
paper were distributed after the conference upon request, without any 
restrictions as to use or further dissemination.57 The court held that the 
claimed invention, an improved cell culture microcarrier, was disclosed in 
the paper presented by one of the inventors at a conference of cell 
culturists.58 The court noted that “between 50 and 500 persons interested 
and of ordinary skill in the subject matter were actually told of the 
existence of the paper and informed of its contents by the oral 
presentation, and the document itself was actually disseminated without 
restriction to at least six persons” after the conference.59 Based on this fact, 
the court determined that the paper constituted a printed publication that 
barred patenting of the invention.60
In Regents of the University of California v. Howmedica, Inc., a district 
court considered whether a slide presentation given at a lecture qualified 
 55. See infra notes 57–60 and accompanying text. See also Deep Welding, Inc. v. Sciaky Bros., 
Inc., 417 F.2d 1227, 1235 (7th Cir. 1969) (holding that papers read at a technical conference qualified 
as a printed publication where copies of the papers were distributed to persons skilled in the relevant 
art); Jursich v. J.I. Case Co., 350 F. Supp. 1125, 1128 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (holding that a telephone 
engineer’s report read at an inter-company meeting of engineers, incorporated into the printed meeting 
minutes, and “disseminated to engineers of at least eleven affiliated but independent telephone 
companies” constituted a printed publication under the statute); Ex parte Brimm, 147 U.S.P.Q. 72, 73 
(Bd. App. 1963) (finding that the advance proof a paper that was “printed, widely circulated . . . and 
discussed at meetings attended by 200 people” qualified as a printed publication). 
 56. See infra notes 61–74 and accompanying text. 
 57. 774 F.2d 1104, 1108–09 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 58. Id. at 1108. 
 59. Id. at 1109. 
 60. Id. In making this determination, the court quoted from In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221 (C.C.P.A. 
1981), as follows:  
[A] document may be deemed a printed publication “upon a satisfactory showing that it has 
been disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and of 
ordinary skill in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it and 
recognize and comprehend therefrom the essentials of the claimed invention without need of 
further research or experimentation.” 
Id. 
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as a printed publication that would bar patentability of the claimed 
invention, a knee prosthesis.61 In this case, the inventor displayed slides at 
a medical convention lecture in front of approximately thirty persons.62 
Participants were under no obligation of confidence or secrecy.63 
However, prints of the slides were not made, and members of the public 
did not have access to the physical slides themselves.64 The court cited 
Philips Electronic for the proposition that slides may constitute printed 
publications, but held that the projection of slides in this case did not 
constitute a printed publication.65 The court stated that it was important to 
note that the public did not have access to the slides themselves and that 
no prints were made.66 “Therefore,” the court stated, “there is no evidence 
that the ‘publication’ was disseminated or otherwise made available to the 
extent that persons interested in the information could locate it and put to 
use the essentials of the claimed invention.”67
In 2004, the Federal Circuit considered in Norian Corp. v. Stryker 
Corp. whether an abstract taken to a professional conference could 
constitute a printed publication when it was not clear that copies of the 
abstract were actually disseminated.68 It was “general practice” at this 
meeting for presenters to distribute abstracts to “interested attendees,” but 
there was no evidence in this case that the abstract disclosing the invention 
was actually distributed to anyone.69 One of the co-authors of the abstract 
testified that he had attended the meeting and had taken a copy of the 
abstract to give to a meeting organizer, but “could not recall whether he 
attended the presentation and could not recall whether copies of the 
[a]bstract were actually available to hand out.”70 Another co-author 
testified that he did attend the presentation, but he “was not questioned 
about the availability of the [a]bstract.”71 The patentee argued that because 
the abstract was only available “upon individual request to the authors,” 
and because “such request and dissemination had not been shown,” it did 
 61. 530 F. Supp. 846 (D.N.J. 1981). 
 62. Id. at 859–60. 
 63. Id. at 850. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 860. After citing Philips Electronic, the court added the word “microfilm” in 
parentheses, apparently to acknowledge that Philips Electronic only dealt with microfilms and not the 
slide projections at issue in this case. Id.  
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. 363 F.3d 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
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not constitute a printed publication.72 The Federal Circuit agreed, finding 
that the district court’s decision in granting the patentee’s motion for 
judgment as a matter of law was supported by “the lack of substantial 
evidence of actual availability of the [a]bstract.”73 Because “there was not 
clear and convincing evidence that the [a]bstract was actually available” at 
the conference, the court held that it did not constitute a patent-defeating 
printed publication under section 102(b).74
D. Poster Presentations 
A somewhat related issue is whether a poster displayed to the relevant 
public for a certain amount of time may constitute a printed publication. In 
Tyler Refrigeration Corp. v. Kysor Industrial Corp., the claimed invention 
was disclosed in photographs and accompanying textual description 
prominently displayed in a booth at two trade shows in Japan.75 The same 
information was also disclosed in brochures that were distributed to 
customers and others involved in the trade.76 The court found that the 
invention was “widely and publicly disclosed” by the display at the trade 
shows77 and that “the disclosure was disseminated in the form of the . . . 
brochures.”78 Thus, the court concluded that “the materials must be 
considered a printed publication within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(b).”79 The court apparently considered the display panels and the 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. The court stated that “[w]hether a document is a prior publication is a question of law” 
and indicated that dissemination and public accessibility are the keys factors to use in determining 
whether a reference constitutes a printed publication. Id. 
 74. Id.  
 75. 601 F. Supp. 590, 602 (D. Del. 1985). The court pointed out that the reference was displayed 
under floodlights. Id.  
 76. Id. at 603. 
 77. Id. The court also noted that some of the visitors at the trade show “carried cameras and 
appeared to take photographs” of the display booth. Id. at 602. 
 78. Id. at 604. 
 79. Id. The court had previously discussed this issue on a motion for summary judgment brought 
by the defendant, who was contesting patent validity. See Tyler Refrigeration Corp. v. Kysor Indus. 
Corp., 553 F. Supp. 279 (D. Del. 1982). In its opinion denying that motion, the court determined that 
previous cases supported “the proposition that the photoprint panels, the written description thereof 
and the offset and xerographical copies of the Brochure could be printed publications,” but that “as a 
general rule the determination of whether materials are printed publications is a mixed question of law 
and fact which can be determined only after trial.” Id. at 284.  
 In the motion for summary judgment and in the final decision on the merits, the cases relied on by 
the defendant and cited with approval by the court included Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. American 
Gym, Recreational & Athletic Equipment Corp., 546 F.2d 530 (3d Cir. 1976), Philips Electronic & 
Pharmaceutical Industries Corp. v. Thermal & Electronics Industries, Inc., 450 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 
1971), and Regents of the University of California v. Howmedica, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 846 (D.N.J. 
1981). See Tyler Refrigeration Corp. v. Kysor Indus. Corp., 601 F. Supp. 590, 601 (D. Del. 1985). In 
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brochures as one reference, and it is not clear whether the court would 
have found that the display alone constituted a printed publication.80
In a case directly addressing the issue of poster presentations, a district 
court found that a displayed reference does not constitute a printed 
publication when no material is distributed to the public. In Browning 
Manufacturing Co. v. Bros, Inc., the inventors displayed an embodiment 
of the claimed invention, an earth compaction roller, along with at least 
three drawings of parts of the invention at a trade exhibition more than one 
year prior to the date they filed a patent application.81 The show was held 
from July 16 to July 24, 1948, at Soldier’s Field in Chicago, Illinois.82 The 
court stated that “[a] great many people” attended the show, and “a 
substantial number must have seen the [inventors’] display.”83 The court 
first noted that display of the roller itself could not invalidate the patent as 
a “public disclosure” under section 102(b), as that section is limited to 
“those disclosures in patents or printed publications, a display of an article 
or machine not being such a document.”84 The court then considered 
whether the drawings displayed along with the invention should qualify as 
printed publications, noting that “[w]hether these drawing are ‘printed 
publications’ within the meaning of Section 102(b) . . . is a question with 
little applicable precedent.”85 Citing Tenney, the court indicated that for a 
reference to be considered “printed” for purposes of the statute, it must be 
Universal Athletic, the Third Circuit indicated that a photograph alone could constitute a printed 
publication within the meaning of the statute, although it ultimately found that the photograph at issue 
did not anticipate the claimed invention under section 103. 546 F.2d at 543–44. It is worth noting that 
the photograph at issue in Universal Athletic appeared in a published magazine, thus fitting more 
squarely within the plain meaning of a printed publication than would a single photograph alone. See 
546 F.2d at 536. For discussion of Philips Electronic, see supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text. 
For discussion of Howmedica, see supra notes 61–67 and accompanying text. 
 80. 601 F. Supp. at 603. Before even considering whether the display booth and brochures would 
constitute a patent-defeating printed publication, the court found the patents at issue invalid on 
independent grounds, based on anticipation by a foreign patent and prior use in the United States. Id. at 
595–601. On appeal, the Federal Circuit stated, “Because a finding of anticipation by the disclosure of 
the [foreign] patent is sufficient to justify the judgment, it is unnecessary to decide the issue of whether 
the . . . patents were also anticipated by the Japanese printed publications.” Tyler Refrigeration v. 
Kysor Indus. Corp., 777 F.2d 687, 690 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 81. 126 U.S.P.Q. 499, 500–02 (D. Minn. 1960). Two of the drawings were “general views,” 
showing the shape and overall dimensions of the roller. Id. at 502. The other drawing was “a large 
detailed illustration or diagram of one pair of wheels with their attendant oscillating mechanism.” Id. 
The court noted that “it is the construction of the oscillating wheel mechanism and the placing of the 
wheels which allegedly makes the invention unique and important.” Id. at 501. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 503. 
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capable of mass production.86 In this case, there was no evidence regarding 
how the drawings were produced and whether “the process used tended to 
create many such reproductions with minimal time and effort.”87 The court 
then stated that another requirement under section 102(b) is that the 
reference be a “publication,” which means that “there must be a 
distribution of a substantial number of the documents to the public 
generally, at least more than one; mere evidence of ability to mass produce 
is not enough.”88 Here, there was no evidence that any copies of these or 
other drawings had been “distributed or otherwise published.”89 Therefore, 
the court concluded that the displayed drawings did not constitute a 
printed publication that would invalidate the patent under section 102(b).90
E. The Klopfenstein Decision 
In a recent case, the Federal Circuit decided that copies of a slide or 
poster presentation need not be distributed in order for the presentation to 
constitute a printed publication that will bar patentability under section 
102(b). In In re Klopfenstein, the court considered whether a printed slide 
presentation should qualify as a patent-defeating printed publication.91 The 
claimed invention in this case, a method of preparing animal foods, was 
disclosed by the inventors in a slide presentation at a meeting of the 
American Association of Cereal Chemists (“AACC”), approximately two 
years before the inventors filed their patent application.92 The reference 
consisted of fourteen slides,93 most of which “only recited what had 
already been known in the field,” and the novel information was presented 
in a concise and relatively simple format.94 The slide presentation was 
 86. Id. The court noted that “it is the ease of mass production that increases the probability that 
the invention will be disclosed to the public for commercial exploitation.” Id. The court further stated 
as follows: 
Printing, though not necessarily requiring the use of a printing press, at least connotes a 
system of reproduction whereby many copies of a document may be easily and quickly 
reproduced from one standard article or set of symbols. Something more than public 
disclosure of any document is meant; it is the method or mode of making the disclosures 
which is also material. 
Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. 380 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 92. Id. at 1346–47. 
 93. Id. at 1351. Of the fourteen slides, one was a title slide, one contained acknowledgments, and 
four presented experiment results in graph and chart format. Id. 
 94. The court noted that the eight slides containing substantive textual information presented the 
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printed out and pasted on poster boards, and this poster presentation was 
“displayed continuously for two and a half days at the AACC meeting,” 
and later for “less than a day” at an Agriculture Experiment Station at 
Kansas State University.95 The public was not prohibited at either 
presentation from taking notes or copying the presentation.96 However, no 
copies of the presentation were disseminated to the public, and it was 
never catalogued or indexed in any catalog, database, or library.97
The Klopfenstein court decided that the “key inquiry” in determining 
whether a reference should qualify as a printed publication under section 
102(b) is whether it was “publicly accessible” and that various factors can 
be considered in making this determination.98 According to the court, 
indexing and distribution are not required for a reference to constitute a 
printed publication, and the truly important factor is simply “whether or 
not a reference has been made ‘publicly accessible.’”99 While the case 
cited for this “public accessibility” rule indicated that both dissemination 
and public accessibility are key elements in determining whether a 
reference is a printed publication,100 the court stated that dissemination in 
this previous case was used “in its literal sense, i.e., ‘make widespread’ or 
‘to foster general knowledge of,’” and that the word was not used “in the 
narrower sense [the patentees] have employed it, which requires 
information “in bullet point format, with no more than three bullet points to a slide” and that “no bullet 
point was longer than two concise sentences.” Id. The court then noted that “most of the eight 
substantive slides only recited what had already been known in the field, and only a few slides 
presented would have needed to have been copied by an observer to capture the novel information 
presented by the slides.” Id. at 1351–52. 
 95. Id. at 1347. 
 96. Id. at 1351. The court stated that the inventors in this case “took no measures to protect the 
information they displayed,” such as by including a disclaimer to discourage copying, and concluded 
that “any viewer was free to take notes from the . . . reference or even to photograph it outright.” Id. 
 97. Id. at 1347. 
 98. Id. at 1348. 
 99. Id. (citing In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). The court further stated as 
follows: 
For example, a public billboard targeted to those of ordinary skill in the art that describes all 
of the limitations of an invention and that is on display for the public for months may be 
neither “distributed” nor “indexed”—but it most surely is “sufficiently accessible to the 
public interested in the art” and therefore, under controlling precedent, a “printed 
publication.” 
Id. at 1348. However, the court listed no case where a billboard was actually used to defeat a patent 
under the printed publication bar in section 102(b). 
 100. Cronyn, 890 F.2d at 1160 (stating that “dissemination and public accessibility are the keys to 
a legal determination whether a prior art reference was ‘published’”). However, while this quotation 
suggests that dissemination is as important as public accessibility in the analysis, the court’s holding in 
Cronyn apparently turned on the question of accessibility. Id. The court stated, “We conclude that in 
the present case . . . the three student theses were not accessible to the public because they had not 
been either cataloged or indexed in a meaningful way.” 
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distribution of reproductions or photocopies.”101 The court held that while 
distribution and indexing may be “proxies for public accessibility,” there 
are other measures of public accessibility that can be considered.102  
The court held that the relevant factors in this case were “the length of 
time the display was exhibited, the expertise of the target audience, the 
existence (or lack thereof) of reasonable expectations that the material 
displayed would not be copied, and the simplicity or ease with which the 
material displayed could have been copied.”103 Because the length of the 
display affects “the opportunity of the public in capturing, processing and 
retaining the information conveyed by the reference,” “[t]he more transient 
the display, the less likely it is to be considered a ‘printed publication.’”104 
Citing Judge Learned Hand’s statement in Jockmus that even an 
“ephemeral” reference may be a printed publication when it is directed to 
those having ordinary skill in the art,105 the court stated that “[t]he 
expertise of the intended audience” is also an important factor, as it 
indicates “how easily those who viewed [the reference] could retain the 
displayed material.”106 The party’s reasonable expectation regarding 
copying of the display is also relevant to a section 102(b) inquiry, as the 
court is reluctant to find that a reference is a printed publication “[w]here 
professional and behavioral norms entitle a party to a reasonable 
expectation that the information displayed will not be copied.”107 Finally, 
 101. 380 F.3d at 1348 n.3 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 656 
(1993)). 
 Arguably, a finding of dissemination should be limited to cases where physical documents have 
been disseminated by reproduction and distribution. One could argue that “dissemination” should 
include only physical dissemination of the copies of the reference, not dissemination of the ideas 
contained therein, as the court suggests here. Apparently, the printed publication bar was originally 
intended to distinguish between type-set printed documents and handwritten documents or oral 
conversations. At that time, as well as now, the ideas shared in handwritten documents or 
conversations could be “made widespread” without physical dissemination; however, the statute was 
not phrased to include every idea that was disseminated to the public, but rather to the printed 
publications that contained those ideas. Thus, limiting a finding of public dissemination to situations 
where a reference is physically distributed to the public may be more in keeping with statutory intent. 
 102. Id. at 1350. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. As an example, the court cited to the lecture slides found not to constitute a printed 
publication in Regents of the University of California v. Howmedica, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 846 (D.N.J. 
1981). For discussion of Howmedica, see supra notes 61–67 and accompanying text. 
 105. Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1351 (citing Jockmus v. Leviton, 28 F.2d 812, 813–14 (2d Cir. 
1928)). For discussion of Jockmus, see supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
 106. Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1351.  
 107. Id. The court stated that where there is a reasonable expectation that the information 
displayed will not be copied, “we are more reluctant to find something a ‘printed publication.’ This 
reluctance helps preserve the incentive for inventors to participate in academic presentations or 
discussions.” Id. The court further stated as follows: 
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“the ease or simplicity with which a display could be copied” is another 
important factor, as a simpler display can be more easily copied by, and 
thus accessible to, the public.108 Because the reference here was displayed 
for a total of approximately three days to an audience skilled in the art,109 
with no prohibition against copying, and because the display was 
relatively simple and the information it disclosed could easily be copied by 
someone taking notes, the court concluded that the reference constituted a 
printed publication.110
In reaching this conclusion, the Klopfenstein court considered the 
opinions in MIT111 and Howmedica,112 which dealt with the same issue. 
Noting that the Federal Circuit in MIT had based its decision on the 
distribution of actual copies of the presentation, the court stated that this 
case “did not limit future determinations of the applicability of the ‘printed 
publication’ bar to instances in which copies of a reference were actually 
offered for distribution.”113 In a footnote, the court cited to the Howmedica 
decision, noting that this case “stands for the important proposition that 
the mere presentation of slides accompanying an oral presentation at a 
professional conference is not per se a ‘printed publication’ for the 
purposes of § 102(b).”114 However, the court stated that “[w]ith regard to 
Where parties have taken steps to prevent the public from copying temporarily posted 
information, the opportunity for others to appropriate that information and assure its 
widespread public accessibility is reduced. These protective measures could include license 
agreements, non-disclosure agreement, anti-copying software or even a simple disclaimer 
informing members of the viewing public that no copying of the information will be allowed 
or countenanced. . . . In this case, the appellants took no measures to protect the information 
they displayed⎯nor did the professional norms under which they were displaying their 
information entitle them to a reasonable expectation that their display would not be copied.  
Id. The court did not indicate how it reached this conclusion regarding professional norms.  
 108. Id. The court stated, “The simpler a display is, the more likely members of the public could 
learn it by rote or take notes adequate enough for later reproduction.” Id. 
 109. Id. The court noted that “[i]n this case, the intended target audience at the AACC meeting 
was comprised of cereal chemists and others having ordinary skill in the art of the . . . patent 
application” at issue. Id. 
 110. Id. at 1352. The court stated as follows:  
The reference itself was shown for an extended period of time to members of the public 
having ordinary skill in the art of the invention . . . . Those members of the public were not 
precluded from taking notes or even photographs of the reference. And the reference itself 
was presented in such a way that copying of the information it contained would have been a 
relatively simple undertaking for those to whom it was exposed—particularly given the 
amount of time they had to copy the information and the lack of any restrictions on their 
copying of the information.  
Id. 
 111. 774 F.2d 1104. For discussion of this case, see supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text. 
 112. 530 F.Supp 846. For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 61–67 and accompanying text. 
 113. 380 F.3d at 1349 (citing MIT, 774 F.2d at 1108–10). 
 114. Id. at 1349 n.4. 
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scientific presentations, it is important to note than an entirely oral 
presentation at a scientific conference that includes neither slides nor 
copies of the presentation is without question not a ‘printed publication’ 
for the purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).”115
III. ANALYSIS 
The court’s decision in Klopfenstein appears to be a departure, or at 
least a change in direction, from previous case law regarding the printed 
publication bar of section 102(b). In previous cases such as MIT and Tyler, 
courts found that a presentation or display constituted a printed publication 
when material was actually distributed to the public.116 When no copies of 
the display or presentation were made or distributed to the public, as in 
Browning or Norian, courts prior to Klopfenstein did not find that the 
reference constituted a printed publication.117 The court’s analysis in 
Klopfenstein also appears inconsistent with its precedents explaining the 
reasons for the printed publication doctrine. Finally, the court’s decision 
has serious implications for future applications of the printed publication 
doctrine, particularly as it relates to those who make presentations at 
professional conferences or trade shows. 
The court’s reasoning in Klopfenstein appears inconsistent with prior 
decisions regarding the printed publication bar of section 102(b). The 
court argued that “public accessibility” is the key inquiry in determining 
whether a reference is a printed publication and that dissemination, if 
considered to be a requirement, should be understood in “its literal sense,” 
meaning to “make widespread” or “foster general knowledge of.”118 The 
court then stated that even a rather transient display, directed to those 
having skill in the art, could constitute a printed publication.119 This 
conclusion appears inconsistent with previous cases, which indicated that 
either the reference must have been actually distributed to those having 
skill in the art120 or that a person skilled in the art should be able to locate 
the reference from a depositary such as a library.121 These situations are 
 115. Id. 
 116. See supra notes 57–60, 75–80 and accompanying text. 
 117. See supra notes 61–74, 81–90 and accompanying text. 
 118. 380 F.3d at 1348 & n.3. 
 119. Id. at 1351. 
 120. See, e.g., Jockmus v. Leviton, 28 F.2d 812, 813 (2d Cir. 1928) (finding that a trade catalog 
distributed to from 50 to 1000 persons constituted a “printed publication” within the meaning of the 
statute). 
 121. See, e.g., Philips Elec. & Pharm. Indus. Corp. v. Thermal & Elec. Indus., Inc., 450 F.2d 1164, 
1171 (3d Cir. 1971) (stating that a person attempting to prove patent invalidity “should be able to 
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different from the case where a reference is temporarily displayed to 
persons having skill in the art, but is never distributed to them nor placed 
in a depositary from which it can be accessed by interested parties.122 
While the court in Klopfenstein correctly quoted Judge Hand’s statement 
in Jockmus that even an ephemeral reference may be a printed publication, 
the reference at issue in Jockmus was a trade catalog that was distributed 
to between 50 to 1000 persons and was meant to be superseded by the next 
year’s catalog.123 Thus, the reference was “ephemeral” because customers 
were likely to throw it away in a year, not because it was only displayed to 
them for a few days at a presentation.124 In the only case prior to 
Klopfenstein where the reference consisted of a temporary display, kept in 
the control of the inventor and not distributed or made publicly accessible 
after the display, the court found that this reference did not constitute a 
printed publication.125 The Klopfenstein court’s interpretation of “public 
dissemination” and “public accessibility” as meaning, essentially, made 
known to the interested public for a few days, appears inconsistent with 
the interpretation of those terms in previous cases. 
make a satisfactory showing that a person interested in and ordinarily skilled in the art can locate it, 
and understand the essentials of the claimed invention without further research or experimentation”); 
see also I.C.E. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 250 F. Supp. 738, 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (stating that a 
“printed, reproduced, or duplicated” document may be considered a printed publication “upon a 
satisfactory showing that such document has been disseminated or otherwise made available to the 
extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable 
diligence, can locate it and recognize and comprehend therefrom the essentials of the claimed 
invention”). Most of the college thesis cases have been directed to the question of whether the 
indexing or cataloguing system of a library would allow members of the public to obtain access to the 
reference. See supra note 51. 
 122. In fact, it seems to strain the meaning of the word “accessibility” to argue that, because a 
poster was shown at a conference for a few days, it can be categorized as publicly accessible. See 
WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 49 (1990) (defining “accessible” as “1. providing 
access; 2a. capable of being reached . . .; 3. capable of being influenced . . .; 4. capable of being used 
or seen . . .; 5. capable of being understood or appreciated”). 
 123. See Jockmus, 28 F.2d at 813. 
 124. The important distinction here seems to be that of control. In Jockmus, Judge Hand labeled 
the reference as “ephemeral” because customers were likely to throw it away when the next year’s 
catalog came out, but they were under no obligation to do so. 28 F.2d at 814. Anyone who received the 
trade catalog was apparently free to keep it forever, if he so desired. Thus, although potentially 
“ephemeral,” the reference was in the hands of members of the public who could do with it as they 
chose. In contrast, the reference in Klopfenstein was “ephemeral” because the inventors chose to 
display it for only a few days. 380 F.3d at 1351. No members of the public had control over the 
reference, although they could potentially have copied from it. The “ephemeral” nature of a reference 
seems to provide much more of a threat to a claim of public accessibility when this transience is due to 
the inventor having complete control over the reference. 
 125. Browning Mfg. Co. v. Bros, Inc., 126 U.S.P.Q. 499 (D. Minn. 1960). See supra notes 81–90 
and accompanying text. 
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The court in Klopfenstein stated that the lack of restrictions placed by 
the inventors on copying of the display and the ease of copying the 
reference were two factors that could be used in determining whether the 
display constituted a printed publication.126 However, this reasoning would 
apply with equal force to purely oral presentations, which the court stated 
would “without question” not constitute a printed publication.127 As part of 
its analysis in this case, the court noted that “any viewer was free to take 
notes from the . . . reference or even to photograph it outright” and that 
because the display was relatively simple, a viewer could easily “learn it 
by rote or take notes adequate enough for later reproduction.”128 However, 
it is not clear why these factors should cause a slide or poster presentation 
to be considered a printed publication. If there were no disclaimer or 
professional expectation to discourage copying, an audience member at a 
purely oral presentation could easily take notes from the presentation, or 
“even [videotape or audiotape] it outright.”129 Thus, there is no good 
reason why the ease of taping the presentation or taking notes from the 
presentation or display should cause a reference to be considered a printed 
publication.130
The Klopfenstein decision has serious implications for future 
applications of the printed publication statutory bar, particularly as it 
relates to those who give presentations at scientific conferences or trade 
shows.131 A scientist who displays a poster at a conference must either take 
 126. 380 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 127. Id. at 1349. The court stated, “With regard to scientific presentations, it is important to note 
that an entirely oral presentation at a scientific conference that includes neither slides nor copies of the 
presentation is without question not a ‘printed publication’ for the purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).” Id. 
 128. Id. at 1351. 
 129. In particular, there seems to be very little difference between an audience member’s ability to 
take notes at an oral presentation accompanied by slides and a presentation that is “entirely oral.”  
 130. One could argue that purely oral presentations should be regarded as printed publications as 
well, as long as they meet the standard of public accessibility laid out in Klopfenstein. However, this 
extension seems clearly inconsistent both with the plain meaning of the word “printed” and with the 
statutory intent. Although the term “printed” now refers to more than just the set-type method of 
printing that the drafters of the statute had in mind, the word “printed” still cannot logically include 
“entirely oral” conversations. An oral conversation is not just inconsistent with the plain meaning of a 
printed publication; it seems to be the complete opposite. Additionally, while one can argue that the 
development of new technologies has made it necessary for courts to extend the printed publication bar 
beyond a strict interpretation of original intent, oral conversations and presentations have been around 
much longer than that, and the drafters of the provision clearly made the decision not to cover these 
potential types of “public disclosures” within the statute. Thus, applying the printed publication bar to 
oral presentations seems clearly inconsistent both with the plain meaning of the statute and with the 
statutory intent. 
 131. This decision also raises interesting questions regarding how future courts will decide the 
issue of whether information posted on the Internet can constitute a printed publication. This issue was 
discussed in a 1999 article by Max Oppenheimer, who concluded that, under current case law, 
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measures to prevent copying of the poster132 or else make sure that, while 
information available on the Internet would not qualify as a printed publication. Oppenheimer, supra 
note 24. He based this conclusion largely on his determination that information on the Internet is not 
“publicly accessible” because the Internet lacks a satisfactory indexing system. Id. at 260. He also 
considered whether, if the literal language of previous cases was deemed broad enough to consider 
Internet posting, the implicit assumptions underlying these cases would be equally valid in the Internet 
context. Id. at 261. He found the second of these assumptions, that “[o]nce a document has become 
publicly available, it will remain so,” to be “troubling” in the Internet context. Id. at 262. He stated, 
“This assumption has two components. The assumption that, once released to the public, the printed 
publication cannot be destroyed or otherwise withdrawn from the public. And the assumption that, 
once released to the public, the printed publication will remain invariable.” Id. at 262–63 (footnote 
omitted). With the Internet, the host of a particular website may remove a document from that site or 
may discontinue hosting altogether. Thus, the public may lose access to the source. Id. at 263. 
Oppenheimer further stated as follows: 
This [removal of a document from a website] would be analogous to the recall and 
destruction of an entire run of books or magazines; however, the difficulty of doing so is by 
no means analogous. Because of the considerably greater difficulty of destroying an entire 
edition of a printed magazine or book once published, the transfer of information through 
such a medium to the public domain is much more certain than the transfer of Internet posted 
information. 
Id.  
 An article written in 2002 discussed and disagreed with Oppenheimer's conclusion. Neal P. 
Pierotti, Does Internet Information Count as a Printed Publication?, 42 IDEA 249 (2002). In this 
article, Pierotti disagreed with many of Oppenheimer’s underlying assumptions and concluded that a 
case-by-case analysis is necessary to determine whether information from the Internet should be 
regarded as a printed publication. Id. Regarding the “implicit assumption” of permanent public access, 
Pierotti noted that papers distributed at a presentation to attendees can constitute printed publications, 
even though those who receive copies may not share with others and the presenter may not necessarily 
make copies available upon future request. Id. A reference such as a trade catalog may also be 
distributed for a limited period of time, after which only those who saved the reference will have 
access to it. Id. Thus, Pierotti argues that information transmitted over the Internet to users, like trade 
catalogs distributed to customers, can constitute a printed publication even though the information may 
later be removed from the web site. Id. 
 The court in Klopfenstein did not appear to credit the “implicit assumption” discussed by 
Oppenheimer, that information disclosed in a printed publication will remain available to the public, as 
it found that information displayed to the relevant public for a only few days may constitute a printed 
publication. See 380 F.3d at 1351. This suggests that information posted on the Internet, if somehow 
directed to the relevant public’s attention, would also constitute a printed publication under the 
Klopfenstein reasoning. The court’s failure to see the difference between the transience of a trade 
catalog in the hands of many customers and that of a display solely controlled by the inventors 
suggests that the court is not using the “underlying assumption” Oppenheimer believed would control 
the analysis. See supra note 124. The court in Klopfenstein also indicated that indexing is not essential 
for a reference to be considered a printed publication, which further undermines Oppenheimer’s 
conclusions. See 380 F.3d at 1348. Thus, the Klopfenstein decision makes it more likely that future 
courts considering the question of Internet documents will make decisions corresponding more to the 
reasoning and conclusions given by Pierotti than by Oppenheimer.  
 132. This requirement might not be very hard to meet, as the court suggests that an inventor could 
simply include a “disclaimer informing members of the viewing public that no copying of the 
information will be allowed or countenanced.” Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1351. Of course, the inventor 
must be familiar with section 102(b) and with current case law interpreting the statute in order to be 
aware that he ought to take these measures. Thus, well-counseled scientists at large companies are 
likely to be aware of this requirement and to include disclaimers in their presentations and displays, 
while those without the knowledge or resources to keep abreast of changes in patent law may discover 
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effectively communicating his research results, he does not disclose all the 
elements of an invention that he may later decide to patent.133 This extra 
need for precautions may have repercussions on the amount of “open and 
free communication” in the scientific community.134
IV. PROPOSAL 
Because of changes in technologies, it is hard to apply the printed 
publication requirement of section 102(b) to information disclosures 
today. By considering the rationales of permanence, reproducibility, public 
accessibility, and public dissemination, courts can attempt to meet 
congressional intent regarding this requirement. Where printed 
information is actually distributed to the public, or where it is left 
accessible to the public, it may be considered a printed publication. 
However, where information is displayed to the public for only a few days 
and copies of the display are never distributed or otherwise made 
accessible to the public, courts should not find that this display constitutes 
a patent-defeating printed publication. By extending the statute to this 
situation, where no principled distinction can be made between this 
presentation and a purely oral presentation, the court in Klopfenstein 
ignored the reasons behind the printed publication requirement.  
As this Note has argued, Klopfenstein is a departure from previous case 
law regarding the public dissemination and accessibility of a reference, a 
departure that holds serious implications for future applications of the 
printed publication bar. However, the Federal Circuit has declined to 
rehear the case en banc135 and it seems very unlikely that the Supreme 
Court would decide to consider this issue, at least at the present time.136 
that they have inadvertently destroyed their chances to obtain a patent on the results of their research. 
 133. The inventor does have a one-year grace period from the time he makes the public disclosure 
to file a patent application. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). Thus, even if a presentation does disclose 
the elements of an invention, an inventor who acts quickly enough may still be able to obtain a patent 
on his invention. 
 134. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, at 47. 
 135. In re Klopfenstein, No. 09/699,950, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 27563 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 8, 2004). 
Thus, the decision of the three-judge panel in Klopfenstein is binding precedent in the Federal Circuit. 
See Newell Cos. v. Kenney Mfg., 864 F.2d 757, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating, “[t]his court has adopted 
the rule that prior decisions of a panel of the court are binding precedent on subsequent panels unless 
and until overturned in banc”). 
 136. There have been few lower court cases regarding this issue, making it unlikely that the 
Supreme Court would decide that the issue is sufficiently far-reaching and important to require its 
consideration. Additionally, the Supreme Court has generally had little involvement in interpreting any 
of the provisions in section 102. But see Donald S. Chisum, The Supreme Court and Patent Law: Does 
Shallow Reasoning Lead to Thin Law?, 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 2 (1999) (stating that the 
Supreme Court has recently been considering more patent cases and that “there is some indication that 
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Thus, Congress should take action and redraft the statute to 
unambiguously return to the standard articulated in previous case law, 
under which copies of a reference must be either actually distributed to the 
public or else placed where the public has continued access to them, in 
order for the reference to constitute a printed publication.137  
Additionally, the general confusion in the case law regarding the 
printed publication requirement suggests that Congress should redraft the 
statute to reflect modern technologies used for disseminating information. 
The statutory language from 1836 is woefully inadequate for twenty-first 
century technologies, and the public dissemination or accessibility 
standard articulated in the case law is often little help. Courts have not 
even begun to address issues regarding the printed publication bar that 
have been raised by the disclosure of information on websites.138 By 
taking action and formulating a comprehensive and clear standard now, 
Congress could help inventors understand what actions would constitute 
dedication of an invention to the public, so that an inventor would know 
what actions would later prevent him from obtaining a patent.139 The 
delimitation of this standard is arguably less important than simply having 
a clear standard by which inventors could guide their behavior, but the 
standard proposed here would allow a reference disclosing a claimed 
invention to destroy patentability only if at least one copy of the reference 
was made physically available and accessible to the public. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Section 102(b) of the Patent Act provides that a patent cannot be 
obtained on an invention described in a printed publication more than one 
year prior to the date of invention. In applying this requirement, courts 
have generally looked to the standards of public dissemination and 
accessibility. In particular, courts have held that a slide or poster 
we should now begin to pay more attention to the United States Supreme Court on matters of patent 
law”). 
 137. Because 28 U.S.C. § 1295 gives the Federal Circuit essentially exclusive appellate 
jurisdiction over patent law cases, Federal Circuit decisions interpreting the Patent Act are extremely 
important in determining how the entire U.S. patent system functions. See Chisum, supra note 136, at 
2 (stating, “Since the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982, we have all said that the Federal Circuit is 
the Supreme Court of patent law because they have virtually exclusive appellate jurisdiction over 
patent matters.”). 
 138. See Oppenheimer, supra note 24; Pierotti, supra note 131. 
 139. If an inventor had this knowledge, he could decide in advance not to give a presentation or to 
limit the information disclosed, or alternatively he could avoid the statutory bar by filing a patent 
application within one year of making the disclosure. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
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presentation made at a conference will only bar patentability under this 
section when copies of the presentation are actually distributed to the 
public. However, the 2004 Federal Circuit decision of In re Klopfenstein 
held that a slide and poster presentation could constitute a printed 
publication even without reproduction or distribution of the reference to 
the public. This decision is inconsistent with previous law and with the 
intent of the statutory provision, and it should be legislatively overruled. 
Additionally, Congress should amend the statute to provide a more clear 
standard for courts applying the statutory bar to modern technologies. 
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